第151回「制度と組織の経済学」研究会 (共催：IPP研究会） 開催のお知らせ

「制度と組織の経済学」研究会はOEIO（The Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and Organizations：東京大学社会科学研究所と大阪大学IPP研究会による研究会）の主催により、理論研究・実証研究を問わず、ミクロ経済理論、マクロ経済理論、経済史等をテーマに研究しています。 皆様のご参加をお待ちしております。

Presenter： 山下拓朗氏（大阪大学 国際公共政策研究科）

Title: “Information Design in Repeated Interaction” (joint with Joao Correia da Silva, University of Porto)

Abstract：How does a long-term relationship affect communication among relevant economic entities? In this paper, we study dynamic information design in repeated interaction, where the state is imperfectly persistent. We observe that dynamics introduces a novel distortion relative to the static counterpart. Even if both parties’ preferences are aligned in some state, revealing that state (which is myopically optimal for the informed) could make it difficult to persuade the uninformed in future periods (when the state switched to those with preference misalignment). This motif can distort the information in two different ways. If the state is moderately persistent (and the parties are moderately patient), then the optimal mechanism exhibits “inefficient pessimism” ; while if the state is much persistent, then it exhibits “inefficient optimism”. Methodologically, we argue that a duality-based approach in solving dynamic information design could be more tractable than a more standard approach.

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