The 151st meeting jointly organized with International Public Policy Seminar
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Date | 2023.4.21 Fri 13:30 - 15:00 |
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How to apply | Send an email to the address listed in the contact section below. |
Contact | KITABAYASHI, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo |
The Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and Organizations, OEIO, meets every month to exchange research ideas on institutional and organizational economics. Participants include both people specialized in theoretical research and those in empirical research. Topics of meetings might be about microeconomic theory, macroeconomic theory, or economic history..., whatever on institutional and organizational economics.
Presenter: Takuro Yamashita, (Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University)
Title: “Information Design in Repeated Interaction” (joint with Joao Correia da Silva, University of Porto)
Abstract: How does a long-term relationship affect communication among relevant economic entities? In this paper, we study dynamic information design in repeated interaction, where the state is imperfectly persistent. We observe that dynamics introduces a novel distortion relative to the static counterpart. Even if both parties’ preferences are aligned in some state, revealing that state (which is myopically optimal for the informed) could make it difficult to persuade the uninformed in future periods (when the state switched to those with preference misalignment). This motif can distort the information in two different ways. If the state is moderately persistent (and the parties are moderately patient), then the optimal mechanism exhibits “inefficient pessimism” ; while if the state is much persistent, then it exhibits “inefficient optimism”. Methodologically, we argue that a duality-based approach in solving dynamic information design could be more tractable than a more standard approach.