The 144th meeting jointly organized with International Public Policy Seminar

The Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and Organizations, OEIO, meets every month to exchange research ideas on institutional and organizational economics.  Participants include both people specialized in theoretical research and those in empirical research.  Topics of meetings might be about microeconomic theory, macroeconomic theory, or economic history..., whatever on institutional and organizational economics.

• Date: Friday, May 20, 2022 13:30 to 15:00
• Place: Will be held online
• Presenter: Akifumi Ishihara, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo

Title: "Employee Referrals and Incentive Schemes"

Abstract: This study investigates employee referral, recruitment through the current employees' referral, and incentive pays in a framework of moral hazard with multiple workers. We first find from online survey data that adopting an employee referral programme or workers' referring experiences are positively associated with group pays. We then construct a theoretical framework to characterize the optimal pattern of incentive scheme and recruitment management. The employer chooses either centralized hiring, where a new employee is found by the employer, or referral hiring, where a new employee is found by an incumbent employee. Consistent with the data, the employer tends to prefer referral hiring as joint performance evaluation is exhibited for the incumbent employee to work hard than relative performance evaluation. We also demonstrate that due to the risk premium paid for the incumbent employee, referral hiring is likely to be preferred when the performance of the incumbent employee is less uncertain.