The 139th Meeting of the Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and Organizations (jointly organized with the Osaka University International Public Policy Seminar)

The Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and Organizations, OEIO, meets every month to exchange research ideas on institutional and organizational economics.  Participants include both people specialized in theoretical research and those in empirical research.  Topics of meetings might be about microeconomic theory, macroeconomic theory, or economic history..., whatever on institutional and organizational economics.

Presenter: Junichiro Ishida, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Title: "Signaling under double-crossing preferences"

Abstract: This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under double-crossing preferences with a continuum of types. There are natural economic environments where he indifference curves of two types cross twice, such that the celebrated single-crossing property fails to hold. Equilibrium exhibits a threshold type below which types choose actions that are fully revealing and above which they pool in a pairwise fashion, with a gap separating the actions chosen by these two sets of types. The resulting signaling action is quasi-concave in type. We also provide an algorithm to establish equilibrium existence by construction.