The 174th「制度と組織の経済学」研究会 開催

The Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and Organizations

Presenter： Yasuo Takatsuki ( Research Institute for Economics & Business
Administration, Kobe University)

Title：“ Complementarities between Long-Term Relationships and Short-Term
Contracts: Case of Early Modern Japan ”
( joint work with Hideshi Itoh and Takashi Shimizu)

Abstract: This paper examines the interaction between formal and relational
enforcement in early modern Japan, focusing on financial relationships
between Daimyo (regional lords) and merchants. Due to class distinctions,loans from merchants to Daimyo lacked legal enforceability, while contracts among merchants were court-enforceable. Some merchants built long-term self-enforcing relationships with Daimyo (becoming Tachiiri), whereas others provided short-term formal loans to underfunded Tachiiri. We develop a model with two markets—one that matches Daimyo with merchants, and the other that matches underfunded Tachiiri with lending merchants—and identify conditions for their co-existence in equilibrium. The analysis shows that merchants value becoming Tachiiri for long-term gains, and that the opportunities for short-term formal lending enhance the sustainability of relational contracts between Daimyo and Tachiiri.

詳細： https://sites.google.com/site/theoeio/coming-meeting