「人材配置の経済学」研究会 カンファレンス（IPP研究会共催）

「人材配置の経済学」研究会は、大阪大学大学院 国際公共政策研究科 瀧井研究室主催により、毎月「人材配置」に関連する論文の報告を行っています。 皆様のご参加をお待ちしております。


【第1報告】 13:30-14:30

Presenter:　片山 由将氏  (神戸大学 大学院経済学研究科）

Title："Readmission Penalty Under Nonlinear Payment Schedules"

Abstract： I examine how hospitals respond to financial incentives. In Japan, the per diem payment is designed to decrease as the length of stay increases to incentivize early discharge. However, under these nonlinear payment schedules, hospitals can increase reimbursements with repeated discharges and readmissions. Using administrative claims data, I study hospital responses to a national policy that penalizes immediate post-discharge readmissions to limit repeated admissions. Exploiting variations created by the program introduction, I find that hospitals delay readmissions for relatively healthy patients to avoid the penalty, while readmissions immediately after discharge decrease for relatively unhealthy patients due to selective readmission. Moreover, there are no detectable effects on health outcomes. These findings demonstrate hospitals’ ability to avoid the penalty through various strategic responses adjusted to patient health status, without resulting in adverse health outcomes.


【第2報告】 14:45-15:45 

Presenter: 小松 功拓氏 （京都大学 経済研究所）

Title： "The Welfare Impact of Reemployment Bonuses"

Abstract：This paper investigates the welfare impact of reemployment bonuses in a dynamic job search model. Reemployment bonuses, monetary incentives offered to workers who obtain employment, may mitigate the moral hazard in unemployment insurance (UI) while preserving consumption smoothing. Using a sufficient statistics approach, I first show the substantial positive impact of reemployment bonuses on welfare given the current level of UI benefits. Then, by using a quantitative model of job search, consumption, and saving, I study the optimal combination of UI benefits and reemployment bonuses. I find that the optimal UI benefit level is higher when reemployment bonuses are incorporated. Compared to the welfare gain achieved by implementing only the optimal level of UI benefits, the optimal combination of UI benefits and reemployment bonuses achieves a 56 percent larger welfare gain.


【第3報告】 16:00-17:00

Presenter: 西山 克彦氏（大阪大学 大学院国際公共政策研究科）

Title： "Shrinking Populations, Aging, and Access to Healthcare"

Abstract：Population shrinkage and aging are inevitable futures for many countries. Using data from Japan, we study the impact of demographic changes on healthcare providers and access to outpatient care. Estimating an entry model that determines the number of physicians in small markets, we confirm that population shrinkage reduces the number of physicians and access to care across the board. In contrast, the impact of aging varies with the mix of patients, decreasing in specialties that cater to younger populations but increasing when older people are the main clients. As a result, access to specialty care will deteriorate for younger people, while that for older people will be more sustainable. Governments can address demographic challenges by increasing provider payments, but simulation analyses suggest that even 20% higher payments may not fully maintain the same level of access to care. Thus, addressing the challenges through payment increases alone could be costly. Because market size determines the degree of specialization, other policies, including de-specialization of health care services, may be needed when cities shrink.

※17：30-から懇親会を予定しております。


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