第162回「制度と組織の経済学」研究会 (共催：IPP研究会） 開催のお知らせ

「制度と組織の経済学」研究会はOEIO（The Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and Organizations：東京大学社会科学研究所と大阪大学IPP研究会による研究会）の主催により、理論研究・実証研究を問わず、ミクロ経済理論、マクロ経済理論、経済史等をテーマに研究しています。 皆様のご参加をお待ちしております。

Presenter： 石田潤一郎 氏（ 大阪大学 社会経済研究所 ）

Title： ” Optimal Feedback Dynamics Against Free-Riding in Collective Experimentation ”(with Chia-Hui Chen, Hulya Eraslan and Takuro Yamashita)

Abstract：We consider a dynamic model in which a principal decides what information to release about a product of unknown quality (e.g., a vaccine) to incentivize agents to experiment with the product. Assuming that the agents are long-lived and forward-looking, their incentive to wait and see other agents' experiences poses a significant obstacle to social learning. We show that the optimal feedback mechanism to mitigate information free-riding takes a strikingly simple form: the principal recommends adoption as long as she observes no bad news, but only with some probability; once she does not recommend at some point, she stays silent forever after that. Our analysis suggests the optimality of premature termination, which in turn implies that: (i) false positives (termination in the good state) are more acceptable than false negatives (continuation in the bad state); (ii) overly cautious mechanisms that are biased toward termination can be welfare-enhancing.

詳細：https://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/ja/oeio-162/